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Abstract- Phishing is a new type of network attack where the attacker creates a replica of an existing Web page to fool users
(e.g., by using specially designed e-mails or instant messages) into submitting personal, financial, or password data to what
they think is their service provides’ Web site. In this project, we proposed a new end-host based anti-phishing algorithm,
which we call Link Guard, by utilizing the generic characteristics of the hyperlinks in phishing attacks. These characteristics
are derived by analyzing the phishing data archive provided by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG). Because it is
based on the generic characteristics of phishing attacks, Link Guard can detect not only known but also unknown phishing
attacks. We have implemented LinkGuard in Windows XP. Our experiments verified that LinkGuard is effective to detect
and prevent both known and unknown phishing attacks with minimal false negatives. LinkGuard successfully detects 195
out of the 203 phishing attacks. Our experiments also showed that LinkGuard is light weighted and can detect and prevent
phishing attacks in real time. Index
Terms-Network security, Phishing attacks, Hyperlink, LinkGuard algorithm.

I.

Phishing itself is not a new concept, but it’s
increasingly used by phishers to steal user
information
and
perform business crime in
recent years.Within one to two years, the number of
phishing attacks increased dramatically. According to
Gartner Inc., for the 12 months ending April 2004,
“there were 1.8 million phishing attack victims, and
the fraud incurred by phishing victims totaled $1.2
billion” .According to the statistics provided by the
Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) , in March
2006, the total number of unique phishing reports
Submitted to the APWG were 18,480; and the top
three phishing site hosting countries are, the United
States (35.13%), China (11.93%), and the Republic of
Korea (8.85%). The infamous phishing attacks
happened in China in recent years include the events
to counterfeit the Bank of China (real Web site
www.bank-ofchina.com, counterfeited Web site
www.bank-offchina.com),the
Industrial
and
Commercial
Bank.cn,
faked
website
www.1cbc.com.cn), the Agricultural Bank of China
(real website www.95599.com,faked Web site
www.965555.com), etc. In this project, we study the
common procedure of phishing attacks and review
possible anti-phishing approaches. We then focus on
end-host based antiphishing approach. We first
analyze the common characteristics of the hyperlinks
in phishing e-mails. Our analysis identifies that the
phishing hyperlinks share one or more characteristics
as listed below: 1) the visual link and the actual link
are not the same; 2)the attackers often use dotted
decimal IP address instead of DNS name; 3) special
tricks are used to encode the hyperlinks maliciously;
4) the attackers often use fake DNS names that are
similar (but not identical) with the target Website. We
then propose an end-host based anti-phishing

INTRODUCTION

The word ‘Phishing’ initially emerged in 1990s. The
early hackers often use ‘ph’ to replace ‘f’ to produce
new words in the hacker’s community, since they
usually hack by phones.Phishing is a new word
produced from ‘fishing’, it refers to the act that the
attacker allure users to visit a faked Website by
sending them faked e-mails (or instant messages), and
stealthily get victim’s personal information such as
user name, password, and national security ID, etc.
These information then can be used for future target
advertisements or even identity theft attacks (e.g.,
transfer money from victims’ bank account).
The frequently used attack method is to send e-mails
to potential victims, which seemed to be sent by
banks, online organizations, or ISPs. In these e-mails,
they will makeup some causes, e.g. the password of
your credit card had been mis-entered for many
times, or they are providing upgrading services, to
allure you visit their Website to conform or modify
your account number and password through the
hyperlink provided in the e-mail. You will then be
linked to a counterfeited Website after clicking those
links. The style, the functions performed, sometimes
even the URL of these faked Websites this work was
supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China (NSFC) under contract No.
60503049. are similar to the real Web site. It’s very
difficult for you to know that you are actually visiting
a malicious site. If you input the account number and
password, the attackers then Successfully collect the
information at the server side, and is able to perform
their next step actions with that information (e.g.,
withdraw money out from your account).
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only focus on the third one. Technically, if we can cut
off one or several of the steps that needed by a
phishing attack, we then successfully prevent that
attack. In what follows, we briefly review these
approaches.

algorithm which we call LinkGuard, based on the
characteristics of the phishing hyperlink. Since
LinkGuard is character-based, it can detect and
prevent not only known phishing attacks but also
unknown ones. We have implemented LinkGuard in
Windows XP, and our experiments indicate that
LinkGuard is light weighted in that it consumes very
little memory and CPU circles, and most importantly,
it is very effective in detecting phishing attacks with
minimal false negatives. LinkGuard detects 195
attacks out of the 203 phishing archives provided by
APWG without knowing any signatures of the
attacks.

1) Detect and block the phishing Web sites in time:
If we can detect the phishing Web sites in time, we
then can block the sites and prevent phishing attacks.
It’s relatively easy to (manually) determine whether a
site is a phishing site or not, but it’s difficult to find
those phishing sites out in time. Here we list two
methods for phishing site detection. 1) The Web
master of a legal Web site periodically scans the root
DNS for suspicious sites (e.g. www.1cbc.com.cn vs.
www.icbc.com.cn).

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we give the general procedure of a
phishing attack and provide the available methods to
prevent phishing attacks. We then analyze the
characteristics of the hyperlinks used in phishing
attacks and present the LinkGuard algorithm in
Section III.Section IV describes our implementation
of the LinkGuard system and gives the experimental
results. Section V concludes this project
.
II. PHISHING ATTACK PROCEDURE AND
PREVENTION METHODS

Since the phisher must duplicate the content of the
target site, he must use tools to (automatically)
download the Webpages from the target site. It is
therefore possible to detect this kind of download at
the Web server and trace back to the phisher. Both
approaches have shortcomings. For DNS scanning, it
increases the overhead of the DNS systems and may
cause problem for normal DNS queries, and
furthermore, many phishing attacks simply do not
require a DNS name. For phishing download
detection, clever phishers may easily write tools
which can mimic the behavior of human beings to
defeat the detection.

In this project, we assume that phishers use e-mail as
their major method to carry out phishing attacks.
Nonetheless, our analysis and algorithm can be
applied to attacks that use other means such as instant
messaging.

2) Enhance the security of the web sites:
The business Websites such as the Web sites of banks
can take new methods to guarantee the security of
users’ personal information. One method to enhance
the security is to use hardware devices. For example,
the Barclays bank provides a hand-held cardreader to
the users. Before shopping in the net, users need to
insert their credit card into the card reader, and input
their (Personal identification number) PIN code, then
the card reader will produce a onetime security
password, users can perform transactions only after
the right password is input. Another method is to use
the biometrics characteristic (e.g. voice, fingerprint,
iris, etc.) for user authentication. For example, Paypal
had tried to replace the single password verification
by voice recognition to enhance the security of the
Web site. With these methods, the phishers cannot
accomplish their tasks even after they have gotten
part of the victims’ information .However, all these
techniques need additional hardware to realize the
authentication between the users and the Web sites
hence will increase the cost and bring certain
inconvenience. Therefore, it still needs time for these
techniques to be widely adopted.

A. The Procedure of Phishing Attacks
In general, phishing attacks are performed with the
following four steps:
1) Phishers set up a counterfeited Web site which
looks exactly like the legitimate Web site, including
setting up the web server, applying the DNS server
name, and creating the web pages similar to the
destination Website, etc.
2) Send large amount of spoofed e-mails to target
users in the name of those legitimate companies and
organizations, trying to convince the potential victims
to visit their Web sites.
3) Receivers receive the e-mail, open it, and click the
spoofed
hyperlink in the e-mail, and input the
required information.
4) Phishers steal the personal information and
perform their fraud such as transferring money from
the victims’ account.
B. Approaches to Prevent Phishing Attacks
There are several (technical or non-technical) ways to
Prevent phishing attacks: 1) educate users to
understand how phishing attacks work and be alert
when phishing-alike e-mails are received; 2) use legal
methods to punish phishing attackers; 3) use technical
methods to stop phishing attackers. In this Project, we

3) Block the phishing e-mails by various spam filters:
Phishers generally use e-mails as ‘bait’ to allure
potential victims. SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol) is the protocol to deliver e-mails in the
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EarthLink Company, PhishGuard, and Net craft, etc.
Though the developers of these tools all announced
that they can update the blacklist in time, they cannot
prevent the attacks from the newly emerged
(unknown) phishing sites.
• Category II: this category of tools uses certain rules
in their software, and checks the security of a Website
according to these rules. Examples of this type of
tools include Spoof Guard developed by Stanford,
Trust Watch of the GeoTrust, etc. Spoof Guard
checks the domain name, URL (includes the port
number) of a Web site, it also checks whether the
browser is directed to the current URL via the links in
the contents of e-mails. If it finds that the domain
name of the visited Web site is similar to a wellknown domain name, or if they are not using the
standard port, Spoof Guard will warn the users. In
TrustWatch, the security of a Web site is determined
by whether it has been reviewed by an independent
trusted third party organization. Both Spoof Guard
and TrustWatch provide a toolbar in the browsers to
notify their users whether the Web site is verified and
trusted. It is easy to observe that all the above defense
methods are useful and complementary to each other,
but none of them are perfect at the current stage. In
the rest of the project we focus on end-host based
approach and propose an end host based LinkGuard
algorithm for phishing detection and prevention. To
this end, our work follows the same approach as [3].
Our work differs from in that: 1) LinkGuard is based
on our careful analysis of the characteristics of
phishing hyperlinks whereas Spoof Guard is more
like a framework; 2) LinkGuard has a verified very
low false negative rate for unknown phishing attacks
whereas the false negative proper of Spoof Guard is
still not known. In next section, we first study the
characteristics of the hyperlinks in phishing e-mails
and then we propose the LinkGuard algorithm.

Internet. It is a very simple protocol which lacks
necessary authentication mechanisms. Information
related to sender, such as the name and email address
of the sender, route of the message, etc., can be
counterfeited in SMTP. Thus, the attackers can send
out large amounts of spoofed e-mails which are
seemed from legitimate organizations.
The phishers hide their identities when sending the
spoofed e-mails, therefore, if anti-spam systems can
determine whether an e-mail is sent by the announced
sender (Am I Whom I Say I Am?), the phishing
attacks will be decreased dramatically. From this
point, the techniques that preventing senders from
counterfeiting their Send ID (e.g. SIDF of Microsoft)
can defeat phishing attacks efficiently.
SIDF is a combination of Microsoft’s Caller ID for Email and the SPF (Sender Policy Framework)
developed by Meng Weng Wong. Both Caller ID and
SPF check e-mail sender’s domain name to verify if
the e-mail is sent from a server that is authorized to
send e-mails of that domain and from that to
determine whether that e-mail use spoofed e-mail
address. If it’s faked, the Internet service provider can
then determine that e-mail is a spam e-mail.
The spoofed e-mails used by phishers are one type of
spam e-mails. From this point of view, the spam
filters can also be used to filter those phishing emails. For example, blacklist, whitelist, keyword
filters, Bayesian filters with self learning abilities,
and E-Mail Stamp, etc., can all be used at the e-mail
server or client systems. Most of these anti-spam
techniques perform filtering at the receiving side by
scanning the contents and the address of the received
e-mails. And they all have pros and cons as discussed
below. Blacklist and whitelist cannot work if the
names of the spamers are not known in advance.
Keyword filter and Bayesian filters can detect spam
based on content, hence can detect unknown spasm.
But they can also result in false positives and false
negatives. Furthermore, spam filters are designed for
general spam e-mails and may not very suitable for
filtering phishing e-mails since they generally do not
consider the specific characteristics of phishing
attacks.
4) Install online anti-phishing software in user’s
computers:
Despite all the above efforts, it is still possible for the
users to visit the spoofed Web sites. As a last defense,
users can install anti-phishing tools in their
computers. The antiphishing tools in use today can be
divided into two categories: blacklist/whitelist based
and rule-based.
• Category I: When a user visits a Web site, the
antiphishing tool searches the address of that site in a
blacklist stored in the database. If the visited site is on
the list, the anti-phishing tool then warns the users.
Tools in this category include ScamBlocker from the

III. LINKGUARD
A. Classification of the hyperlinks in the
phishing e-mails
In order to (illegally) collect useful information from
potential victims, phishers generally tries to convince
the users to click the hyperlink embedded in the
phishing e-mail. A hyperlink has a structure as
follows.
<a href="URI"> Anchor text <\a>
Where ‘URI’ (universal resource identifiers) provides
the necessary information needed for the user to
access the networked resource and ‘Anchor text’ is
the text that will be displayed in user’s Web browser.
Examples of URIs are http://www.google.com,
https://www.icbc.com.cn/login.html,
ftp://61.112.1.90:2345, etc. ‘Anchor text’ in general
is used to display information related to the URI to
help the user to better understand the resources
provided by the hyperlink. In the following hyperlink,
the URI links to the phishing archives provided by
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something to do with paypal <a href=
“http://www.paypal-cgi.us/webscr.php?
cmd=LogIn”> Click here to confirm your account
5) The attackers utilize the vulnerabilities of the
target Web site to redirect users to their phishing sites
or to launch CSS (cross site scripting) attacks. For
example, the following link
<a href=“http://usa.visa.com/track/dyredir.jsp?rDirl=
http://200.251.251.10/.verified/”> Click here <a>
Once clicked, will redirect the user to the phishing
site 200.251.251.10 due to a vulnerability of
usa.visa.com.

the APWG group, and its anchor text “Phishing
Archive” informs the user what’s the hyperlink is
about.
<a
href“http://www.antiphishing.org/phishing
archive.html”> Phishing Archive </a>
Note that the content of the URI will not be
displayed in user’s Web browser. Phishers therefore
can utilize this fact to play trick in their ‘bait’ e-mails.
In the rest of the project, we call the URI in the
hyperlink the actual link and the anchor text the
visual link.
After analyzing the 203 (there are altogether 210
phishing e-mails, with 7 of them with incomplete
information or with malware attachment and do not
have hyperlinks) phishing email archives from Sep.
21st 2003 to July 4th 2005 provided by APWG. We
classified the hyperlinks used in the phishing e-mail
into the following categories:
1) The hyperlink provides DNS domain names in the
anchor text, but the destination DNS name in the
visible link doesn’t match that in the actual link.
For instance, the following hyperlink:
<ahref+http://www.profusenet.net/checksession.php>
“http://www.profusenet.net/checksession.php”>
https://secure.regionset.com/EBanking/logon/</a>
appears to be linked to secure.regionset.com, which
is the portal of a bank, but it actually is linked to a
phishing site www.profusenet.net.
2) Dotted decimal IP address is used directly in the
URI or the anchor text instead of DNS name. See
below for an example.
<a href=
“http://61.129.33.105/secured_site/www.skyfi.com/
index.html?MfcISAPICommand=SignInFPP&Using
SSL=1”> SIGN IN</a>
3) The hyperlink is counterfeited maliciously by
using certain encoding schemes. There are two cases:
a) The link is formed by encoding alphabets into their
corresponding ASCII codes. See below for such a
hyperlink.
<a
href=“http://%34%2E%33%34%2E%31%39%35%2
E%34%31:%34%39%30%33/%6C/%69%6E%64%6
5%78%2E%68%74%6D”> www.citibank.com </a>
While this link is seemed pointed www.citibank.com,
it actually points to http://4.34.195.41:34/l/index.htm.
b) Special characters (e.g. @ in the visible link) are
used to fool the user to believe that the e-mail is from
a trusted sender. For instance, the following link
seems is linked to amazon, but it actually is linked to
IP address 69.10.142.34. http://www.amazon.com:
fvthsgbljhfcs83infoupdate @69.10.142.34.
4) The hyperlink does not provide destination
information in its anchor text and uses DNS names in
its URI. The DNS name in the URI usually is similar
with a famous company or organization. For instance,
the following link seems to be sent from paypal, but it
actually is not. Since paypal-cgi is actually registered
by the phisher to let the users believe that it has

Table 1 summarizes the number of hyperlinks and
their percentages for all the categories. It can be
observed that most of the phishing e-mails use faked
DNS names (category 1,44.33%) or dotted decimal IP
addresses (category 2, 41.87%). Encoding tricks are
also frequently used (category 3a and 3b, 17.24%).
And phishing attackers often try to fool users by
setting up DNS names that are very similar with the
real ecommence sites or by not providing destination
information in the anchor text (category 4). Phishing
attacks that utilize the vulnerability of Web sites
(category 5) are of small number (2%) and we leave
this type of attacks for future study.
Note that a phishing hyperlink can belong to several
categories at the same time. For instance, an attacker
may use tricks from both categories 1 and 3 at the
same time to increase his success chance. Hence the
sum of percentages is larger than 1.
Category
1
2
3.a
3.b
4
5

Number of Links
90
85
19
16
67
4
TABLE I

Percentage
44.33%
41.85%
9.36%
7.8%
33%
2%

THE CATEGORIES OF HYPERLINKS IN
PHISHING E-MAILS.
Once the characteristics of the phishing hyperlinks
are understood, we are able to design anti-phishing
algorithms that can detect known or unknown
phishing attacks in real-time. We present our
LinkGuard algorithm in the next subsection.
B. The LinkGuard algorithm
LinkGuard works by analyzing the differences
between the visual link and the actual link. It also
calculates the similarities of a URI with a known
trusted site. The algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 1. The
following terminologies are used in the algorithm.
v_link: visual link;
a_link: actual_link;
v_dns: visual DNS name;
a_dns: actual DNS name;
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36 int minchange = the minimum number of
37 changes needed to transform str
38 to actual_dns (or vice verse);
39 if (thresh<(maxlen-minchange)/maxlen<1)
40 return true
41 return false;
}
Fig. 2. The subroutines used in the LinkGuard
algorithm.

sender_dns: sender’sDNS name.
int LinkGuard (v_link, a_link} {
1 v_dns = GetDNSName (v_link);
2 a_dns = GetDNSName (a_link);
3 if ((v_dns and a_dns are not
4 empty) and (v_dns! = a_dns))
5 return PHISHING;
6 if (a_dns is dotted decimal)
7 return POSSIBLE_PHISHING;
8 if (a_link or v_link is encoded)
9{
10 v_link2 = decode (v_link);
11 a_link2 = decode (a_link);
12 return LinkGuard (v_link2, a_link2);
13}
14 /* analyze the domain name for
15 possible phishing */
16 if (v_dns is NULL)
17 return AnalyzeDNS (a_link);
}

(Categories 3 and 4), we first decode the links, then
recursively call LinkGuard to return a result (lines 813). When there is no destination information (DNS
name or dotted IP address) in the visual link
(category 5), LinkGuard calls AnalyzeDNS to
analyze the actual dns (lines 16 and 17). LinkGuard
therefore handles all the 5 categories of phishing
attacks.
AnalyzeDNS and the related subroutines are depicted
in Fig.2. In AnalyzeDNS, if the actual dns name is
contained in the blacklist, then we are sure that it is a
phishing attack (lines 18 and 19). Similarly, if the
actual dns is contained in the whitelist, it is therefore
not a phishing attack (lines 20 and 21). If the actual
dns is not contained in either whitelist or blacklist,
PatternMatching is then invoked (line 22).

Fig. 1. Description of the LinkGuard algorithm.
The LinkGuard algorithm works as follows. In its
main routine LinkGuard, it first extracts the DNS
names from the actual and the visual links (lines 1
and 2). It then compares the actual and visual DNS
names, if these names are not the same, then it is
phishing of category 1 (lines 3-5). If dotted decimal
IP address is directly used in actual dns , it is then a
possible phishing attack of category 2 (lines 6 and 7).
We will delay the discussion of how to handle
possible phishing attacks later. If the actual link or the
visual link is encoded

PatternMatching:
Pattern maching is designed to handle unknown
attacks (blacklist/whitelist is useless in this case). For
category 5 of the phishing attacks, all the information
we have is the actual link from the hyperlink (since
the visual link does not contain DNS or IP address of
the destination site), which provide very little
information for further analysis. In order to resolve
this problem, we try two methods: First, we extract
the sender email address from the e-mail. Since
phishers generally try to fool users by using (spoofed)
legal DNS names in the sender e-mail address, we
expect that the DNS name in the sender address will
be different from that in the actual link. Second, we
proactively collect DNS names that are manually
input by the user when she surfs the Internet and store
the names into a seed set, and since these names are
input by the user by hand, we assume that these
names are trustworthy. PatternMatching then checks
if the actual DNS name of a hyperlink is different
from the DNS name in the sender’s address (lines 23
and 24), and if it is quite similar (but not identical)
with one or more names in the seed set by invoking
the Similarity (lines 25-30) procedure.

int AnalyzeDNS (actual_link) {
/* Analyze the actual DNS name according
to the blacklist and whitelist*/
18 if (actual_dns in blacklist)
19 return PHISHING;
20 if (actual_dns in whitelist)
21 return NOTPHISHING;
22 return PatternMatching(actual_link);
}
int PatternMatching (actual_link){
23 if (sender_dns and actual_dns are different)
24 return POSSIBLE_PHISHING;
25 for (each item prev_dns in seed_set)
26 {
27 bv = Similarity(prev_dns, actual_link);
28 if (bv == true)
29 return POSSIBLE_PHISHING;
30 }
31 return NO_PHISHING;
}
float Similarity (str, actual_link) {
32 if (str is part of actual_link)
33 return true;
34 int maxlen = the maximum string
35 lengths of str and actual_dns;

Similarity checks the maximum likelihood of actual
dns and the DNS names in seed set. As depicted in
Fig. 2, the similarity index between two strings are
determined by calculating the minimal number of
changes (including insertion, deletion, or revision of a
character in the string) needed to transform a string to
the other string. If the number of changes is 0, then
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detailed information of the hyperlink. The rationale
behind this choice is that users generally may have
more knowledge of a link than a computer in certain
circumstances (e.g., the user may know that the
dotted decimal IP address is the address of his
friend’s computer and that www.iee.org is a respected
site for electrical engineers).

the two strings are identical; if the number of changes
is small, then they are of high similarity; otherwise,
they are of low similarity. For example, the similarity
index of ‘microsoft’ and ‘micr0s0ft’ is 7/9 (since we
need change the 2 ‘0’s in micr0s0ft to ‘o’. Similarly,
the similarity index of ‘paypal’ and ‘paypal-cgi’ is
6/10 (since we need to remove the last 4 chars from
paypal-cgi), and the

For category 5, LinkGuard may also result in false
negatives. False negatives are more harmful than
false positives, since attackers in this case will
succeed in leading the victim to the phishing sites.
For instance, when the sender’s e-mail address and
the DNS name in the actual link are the same and the
DNS name in the actual link has a very low similarity
index with the target site, LinkGuard will return NO
PHISHING. For instance, PatternMatching will treat
the below link as NO PHISHING.

Similarity index of ‘95559’ and ‘955559’ is 5/6 (since
we need to insert a ‘5’ to change ‘95559’ to
‘955559’).
If the two DNS names are similar but not identical,
then it is a possible phishing attack. For instance,
PatternMatching can easily detect the difference
between www.icbc.com.cn (which is a good ecommence Web site) and www.1cbc.com.cn (Which
is a phishing site), which has similarity index 75%.
Note
that
PatternMatching
may
treat
www.1cbc.com.cn as a normal site if the user had
never visit www.1cbc.com.cn before. This false
negative, however, is unlikely to cause any severe
privacy or financial lose to the user, since she actually
does not have anything to lose regarding the Web site
www.icbc.com.cn (since she never visits that Web
site before)!

<ahref="http://fdicsecure.com/application.htm">
Click here </a>
With “securehq@fdic-secure.com” as the sender
address. We note that this kind of false negatives is
very unlikely to result in information leakage, since
the end user is very unlikely to have information the
attack interested (since the DNS name in this link is
not similar with any legal Web sites).

B. False positives and false negatives handling
Since LinkGuard is a rule-based heuristic algorithm,
it may cause false positives (i.e., treat non-phishing
site as phishing site) and false negatives (i.e., treat
phishing site as nonphishing site). In what follows,
we show that LinkGuard may result in false positives
but is very unlikely to cause harmful false negatives.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION
OF LINKGUARD
We have implemented the LinkGuard algorithm in
Windows XP. It includes two parts: a whook.dll
dynamic library and a LinkGuard executive. The
structure of the implementation is depicted in Fig 3

For phishing attacks of category 1, we are sure that
there are no false positives or false negatives, since
the DNS names of the visual and actual links are not
the same. It is also easy to observe that LinkGuard
handles categories 3 and 4 correctly since the
encoded links are first decoded before further
analysis.
For category 2, LinkGuard may result in false
positives, since using dotted decimal IP addresses
instead of domain names may be desirable in some
special circumstances (e.g., when the DNS names are
still not registered). For category 5, LinkGuard may
also result in false positives. For example we know
that both ‘www.iee.org’ and ‘www.ieee.org’ are legal
Web sites. But these two DNS names have a
similarity index of 3/4, hence is very likely to trigger
a false positive.

Fig 3 LINK GUARD ALOGRITHM

Whook is a dynamic link library, it is dynamically
loaded into the address spaces of the executing
processes by the operating system. whook is
responsible for collecting data, such as the called
links and visual links, the user input URLs. More
specifically, whook.dll is used to: 1) install a BHO
(browser helper object) for IE to monitor user input
URLs; 2) install an event hook with the

When it is a possible false positive, LinkGuard will
return a POSSIBLE PHISHING. In our
implementation (which will be described in the next
section), we leverage the user to judge if it is a
phishing attack by prompting a dialogue box with
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SetWinEventHook provided by the Windows
operating system to collect relevant information; 3)
retrieve sender’s e-mail address from Outlook; 4)
analyze and filter the received windows and browser
events passed by the BHO and the hook, and pass the
analyzed data to the LinkGuard executive.

V. CONCLUSION
Phishing has becoming a serious network security
problem, causing finical lose of billions of dollars to
both consumer send e-commerce companies. And
perhaps more fundamentally, phishing has made ecommerce distrusted and less attractive to normal
consumers. In this paper, we have studied the
characteristics of the hyperlinks that were embedded
in phishinge-mails. We then designed an anti
phishing algorithm, Link-Guard, based on the derived
characteristics. Since Phishig-Guard is characteristic
based, it can not only detect known attacks, but also
is effective to the unknown ones. We have
implemented Link Guard for Windows XP. Our
experiment showed that LinkGuard is light-weighted
and can detect upto 96% unknown phishing attacks in
real-time. We believe that LinkGuard is not only
useful for detecting phishing attacks, but also can
shield users from malicious or unsolicited links in
Web pages and Instant messages. Our future work
includes further extending the LinkGuard algorithm,
so that it can handle CSS (cross site scripting) attacks.

LinkGuard is the key component of the
implementation. It is a stand alone windows program
with GUI (graphic user interface). Analyzer, Alerter,
Logger, Comm, and Database. The functionalities of
these 5 parts are given below:
Comm: Communicate with the whook.dll of all of the
monitored processes, collect data related to user input
fromother processes (e.g. IE, outlook, firefox, etc.),
and sendthese data to the Analyzer, it can also send
commands (such as block the phishing sites) from the
LinkGuard
executiveto
whook.dll.
The
communication between the LinkGuardprocess and
other processes is realized by the shared memory
mechanism provided by the operating system.
Database: Store the whitelist, blacklist, and the user
inputURLs.
Analyzer: It is the key component of LinkGuard,
whichimplements the LinkGuard algorithm,. It uses
data providedby Comm and Database, and sends the
results to the Alertand Logger modules.
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Alerter: When receiving a warning messages from
Analyzer,it shows the related information to alert the
users and send back the reactions of the user back to
the Analyzer.
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